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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) allows business expense
deductions to be taken for travel expenses incurred while away from home in pursuit
of a trade or business.' The Ninth Circuit interpreted section 162-specifically the
definition of "home"-in Henderson v. Commissioner.2 In Henderson, the court held
that the term "home" meant a taxpayer's principal place of business.3 This definition
is not only unsupported by the Code or the Treasury regulations issued pursuant to
the Code, but nonsensical and problematic for today's taxpayer living in an
increasingly mobile society.4 The Ninth Circuit based its definition on non-binding
revenue rulings as well as case authority with an unimpressive history of
contradictory holdings. 5 Consequently, the Henderson decision will yield confusion
and unfairness to taxpayers not likely contemplated by the Ninth Circuit.
Part II discusses the background authority upon which Henderson is based.6
This discussion provides an analysis of the statutory source of the travel expense
deduction, applicable Treasury regulations and revenue rulings, and relevant case
law.7 Part III summarizes the facts of Henderson, discusses the tax court's
disposition, and addresses the Ninth Circuit's analysis.8 In addition, Part III
emphasizes the relevant similarities and distinctions between the cases previously
discussed.9 Part IV discusses the importance of the Henderson interpretation in light
1. I.R.C. § 162 (West 2001).
2. 143 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1998).
3. Id.
4. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the problems with the interpretation of "home" as a taxpayer's principal
place of business).
5. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 497.
6. Infra Part Il.
7. Infra Part 11.
8. Infra Part III.
9. Infra Part HI.
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of a cohesive Code as well as the impact on taxpayers with non-traditional work
arrangements.'° In particular, Part IV considers statutory interpretation techniques
particular to the Code and compares the different results such techniques would
yield if employed in Henderson."' Additionally, Part IV focuses on the fact that
modem employment schemes, with the help of technological advancements, actually
result in a taxpayer having a home away from the individual taxpayer's principal
place of business, thus making the Ninth Circuit's definition impractical and subject
to strong challenge and harsh criticism. 12 The cumulative effect of these materials
will demonstrate that the definition of a "home" contained in Henderson was a poor
judgment on the part of the Ninth Circuit.
II. SECTION 162, ADMINISTRATIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS, AND PRIOR CASES
A. The Language of Section 162
Section 162(a)(2) states that traveling expenses incurred by a taxpayer while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business are deductible. 13 The statute is
deceptively simple. The concise language and lack of examples lends no assistance
as to how it should be applied. 14 Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the relevant
Treasury regulations and revenue rulings to determine the intended definition of
"home."
B. Pertinent Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings
Treasury regulations are rules and regulations of general applicability necessary
for the enforcement of the Code adopted by the Treasury Department as authorized
by Congress.' 5 Courts show great deference to final regulations; few are ruled
invalid. 1
6
Section 1.162-2, the only regulation on point, does not address the issue of what
is a "home" for section 162 purposes. 17 The only definition given in the regulation
is that of traveling expenses. Such expenses include transportation expenses as well
as meals, lodging, and other costs that are incidental to travel.'
8
Revenue rulings, informal statements of position issued by the IRS, describe
hypothetical fact situations, state results, and briefly provide reasons to support the
10. Infra Part IV.
11. Infra Part IV.
12. Infra Part IV.
13. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1999).
14. Id.
15. JOSEPH M. DODGE, ETAL., FEDERAL INCOMETAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 12 (2d ed. 1999).
16. Id.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (2000).
18. Id.
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results.' 9 The tax court and some courts of appeals dispute the appropriate degree of
deference to be accorded to revenue rulings; the tax court tends to give them more
credence than would some courts of appeals.2°
Relevant to defining "home" for purposes of section 162 are tests set forth by
the IRS in Revenue Ruling 73-529 and its predecessor Revenue Ruling 60-189.2l
Revenue Ruling 60-189 considered the definition of "home" in the case of two
construction workers, one of whom found the bulk of his employment away from
his residence. 2 The IRS conceded that to read "home" as totally void of any
common meaning and to be understood as including only a taxpayer's principal
place of business would "wretch the meaning of the word beyond the permissible
bound of statutory construction., 23 The IRS articulated two considerations in
resolving the question: (1) whether a claimed place of abode is the taxpayer's
regular place of abode in a real and substantial sense; and (2) whether the facts as
a whole tend to show that the undertaking of jobs away from the point where
business contacts are normally maintained is primarily for business rather than for
personal reasons.24
Revenue Ruling 73-529 expanded on this discussion in the context of two
traveling salesmen, one of whom traveled constantly.2 5 The IRS listed three
objective factors to be used to determine if the taxpayer's claimed home is his
regular place of abode in a real and substantial sense: (1) whether the taxpayer
performs a portion of his business in the vicinity of this claimed abode and uses such
abode while performing such business there; (2) whether the taxpayer's living
expenses incurred at this claimed abode are duplicated because his business requires
him to be away therefrom; and (3) whether the taxpayer (a) has not abandoned the
vicinity in which his historical place of lodging and his claimed abode are both
located, (b) has a member or members of his family currently residing at the abode,
26
or (c) uses his claimed abode frequently for purposes of his lodging.
Revenue Ruling 73-529 is an unexplained expansion on Revenue Ruling 60-
189. Also, there is a disadvantage in relying on revenue rulings, as mentioned above,
in that the amount of deference given to them varies among courts.27 Finally, as will
be discussed below, 28 courts have paraphrased certain criteria in such a manner that
it becomes questionable as to precisely how far the IRS intended Revenue Ruling
73-529 to extend.29
19. DODGE, supra note 15, at 12.
20. Id.
21. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60.
22. Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37.
26. Id.
27. DODGE, supra note 15, at 12.
28. See infra Part II.C (paraphrasing the tests put forth in Revenue Ruling 73-529).
29. See infra Part II1.D (discussing various courts' interpretation of Revenue Ruling 73-529).
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C. Relevant Case Law Discussed in Henderson
1. Facts, Reasoning, and Holdings
Prior to Henderson, a history of cases contributed to the development of a
definition for the term "home" as employed by section 162. In 1946, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged this dispute over the definition in
Commissioner v. Flowers.3°
In Flowers, the taxpayer, a lawyer who had lived and practiced law in Jackson,
Mississippi, was employed as the principal counsel of a railroad with its main office
in Mobile, Alabama, with the understanding that he could continue to reside in
Jackson, if he paid for his travel expenses between Jackson and Mobile and living
expenses at both places.31 The railroad allowed him to do his work in either Jackson
or Mobile but only provided him with an office in Mobile.32 Although he did not
work exclusively in Mobile, he sought to deduct the cost of transportation, lodging,
and meals for 73 trips between the cities.33
The issue in Flowers, as in Henderson, was whether the expenses were
deductible as travel expenses pursuant to the predecessor to section 162. However,
before resolving this issue, the Court had to grapple with what definition of "home"
it would apply in construing the statute.35
Interestingly, the Court specifically declined to solve the dispute, although
noting that a direct conflict existed as between the meanings "place of business" and
"actual residence. 36 Instead, the Court stated the following three elements must be
satisfied before a traveling expense deduction could be taken under the predecessor
to section 162: "(1) the expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling
expense, as that term is generally understood; (2) the expense must be incurred
while away from home; and (3) the expense must be incurred in pursuit of
business. 37 The Court then side-stepped the issue presented by the second criterion
and denied the deduction, holding that since the first and third criteria were not met,
it was not necessary to define "home. 38
The significance of the Court's failure to address the issue is that courts in later
cases had no guidance as to the proper application of the second element.
39
Specifically, the court in Henderson employed the Flowers test with no guidance as
30. 326 U.S. 465, 471 (1946).
31. Id. at467.
32. Id. at 468.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 469.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 472.
37. Id. at 470.
38. Id. at 472.
39. See Parts II.C, II.D (listing and examining a number of cases in this area which, although seemingly
indistinguishable on their facts, reach different and conflicting dispositions).
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to how the second element should be applied. Equally significant is Justice
Rutledge's dissent in which he argued that when Congress used the word "home"
in the predecessor to section 162, it did not mean "business headquarters." 40 Rather,
Congress intended "home" to be defined as used in everyday parlance.4 Justice
Rutledge further stated that administrative construction exceeds its bounds when it
construes a statute to nullify the plain meaning of a non-technical term not artfully
employed, much like Congress' admission in Revenue Ruling 60-189.42 Justice
Rutledge, then, would appear to concur with the dissent in Henderson that "home"
refers to a taxpayer's principal residence.43
As in Henderson, the taxpayer in Flowers maintained his family, personal,
political, and religious connections, paid taxes, voted, and resided in one locale for
a number of years." Moreover, the taxpayer's sole reason for going to Mobile was
his employment, which required his presence there from time to time.45 However,
the fact that he returned to Jackson whenever his employment would allow made
Jackson his home.46
Additionally, Justice Rutledge commented on the inherent unfairness in the
criteria set forth by the Court.47 Justice Rutledge announced that he believed the sole
issue in the case was a question of law requiring construction of the statute as to the
meaning of the word "home., 48 Application of the Court's criteria depended upon
this determination.49 If the term were construed against the traveling taxpayer, as the
tax court had done by defining it to mean "principal place of business," then the
taxpayer would always fail to meet the second criterion; thus always failing to get
the deduction. As a result, by failing to strike down "principal place of business" as
the meaning of "home," the Court acquiesced in the tax court's definition and
established a flawed test, for the result of its application will always be detrimental
to a taxpayer who must travel to work.
Subsequent to the decision reached in Flowers, the Ninth Circuit considered the
definition of a "home" in James v. United States.50 In James, the taxpayer was a
traveling salesman. 5' In computing his personal income tax, he deducted all sums
spent for hotel rooms, meals, and tips while away from Reno, Nevada. 2 He claimed
40. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 479 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
43. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 501 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
44. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 475 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 477 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 308 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1962).
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id.
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that these items were travel expenses incurred while away from home in pursuit of
a trade or business and were therefore deductible.53
The taxpayer's contacts with Reno included maintaining a Post Office box and
bank account, dealing with a stock broker, purchasing a car and insurance, filing an
income tax return, and storing certain personal belongings. 54 The taxpayer spent a
total of 30 days per year in Reno, about the same amount of time he spent in other
cities.55
The sole issue in the case, as in Henderson, was whether the taxpayer could
claim Reno, Nevada, as his home for tax purposes.56 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's finding that the taxpayer lacked a home for tax purposes, and held
that he could not deduct expenses incurred while away from Reno.57
The Ninth Circuit, similar to the Court in Flowers, did not directly address the
specific definition of "home. 58 Rather, the court glossed over the issue and
announced yet another test to determine a taxpayer's home. 59 The court stated that
expenditures for travel expenses can be said to arise from business necessity only
to the extent that the taxpayer must pay more for these items as a result of travel for
business purposes. 60 This increased burden can arise from duplication of expenses.
61
Therefore, the deduction for traveling expense should be allowed only when the
taxpayer has a "home," the maintenance of which will be duplicated by the
expenditures the taxpayer makes when required to travel for business purposes.62
Thus, the taxpayer has a "home" for this purpose only when he has incurred
continuing living expenses at a permanent residence.63
The court failed to give a specific definition to the term, but provided a
condition to satisfy section 23(a)(1)(A), the predecessor to section 162.
64
Interestingly, the court did note the issue regarding the definition of the term
"home" in a footnote, merely introducing the dispute as to whether "home" refers
to a place of residence or to a principal place of employment.65 The court then
cursorily dismissed the significance of the issue by stating that its resolution would
not be determinative in that case, as the taxpayer could not identify a place of
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. James, 308 F.2d at 205.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 208.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 206.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 207.
63. Id. at 208.
64. Id.
65. See James, 308 F.2d at 206 n.3 (noting the existence of an issue with respect to the definition of
"home").
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residence.66 Surprisingly, and without further explanation, the court adopted the
"place of residence" definition.67 Therefore, this case clearly stands for the
proposition that "home" refers to place of residence. However, where a taxpayer can
identify a place of residence, but cannot identify substantial duplication of expenses
incurred while traveling for business purposes, as in Henderson, the outcome is less
predictable.
Subsequent to the decision reached in James, the First Circuit addressed the
definition of "home" in Hantzis v. Commissioner.68 In Hantzis, the taxpayer, a law
student in Boston, obtained summer employment in New York.69 The taxpayer's
husband remained in Boston and lived at the couple's home.7° The taxpayer
deducted travel expenses incurred during the summer as a result of her travel
between Boston and New York. 71 A central issue in the case was whether the cost
of the taxpayer's transportation, lodging, and meals while in New York, was
incurred while away from home.72 The First Circuit reversed the tax court, holding
that her home for purposes of section 162 was New York; therefore, the expenses
at issue were not incurred "while away from home., 73
Again, the First Circuit, like the Court in Flowers and the Ninth Circuit in
James, did not specifically define "home. 74 Rather, the court looked to the rationale
behind the deduction to define "home" in specific situations as opposed to
announcing a general definition.75 The court stated that section 162 seeks to relieve
the burden of the taxpayer who must maintain two homes and consequently incur
additional living expenses because of the necessity of his business.76 The court
found that the taxpayer's business did not require that she maintain two homes, but
that the home in Boston was kept for personal reasons involving her husband.77 The
court concluded with the caveat that, by this holding, it did not adopt a rule that the
"home" in Section 162 is equivalent to a taxpayer's place of business. 78 Therefore,
the majority promoted the idea that a definition should be formulated on a case-by-
case basis.
More definitive on the "home" issue, however, was the concurring opinion
rendered by Judge Keeton, in which he opined that the term "home" should be given
66. See id. (stating that the resolution of the case would be the same regardless of which definition of "home"
is employed).
67. Id.
68. 638 F.2d 248 (lst Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 249.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 250.
73. Id. at 254.
74. Id. at 253.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 254.
78. Id. at 255.
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its ordinary meaning to avoid causing confusion and risking misinterpretation.79
Judge Keeton pointed out that a common sense meaning of "home" works well to
achieve the purpose of section 162, thus advocating a general definition as opposed
to a case-by-case formulation.8° Using the same reasoning as Justice Rutledge, Judge
Keeton stated that when Congress uses a non-technical word in a tax statute, it
presumably intends courts to read that term in the way that ordinary people would
understand.81 Moreover, as noted by Judge Keeton, a definite disadvantage arises
when a single term within a body of law can be understood only by those who are
experts in that body of law's terminology.
8 2
2. Summary
Analysis of these cases reveals a multitude of approaches taken by the courts
and individual judges to define "home" for purposes of section 162. The United
States Supreme Court failed to define "home" in Flowers, yet a strong dissent by
Justice Rutledge exhibited a congruence with the Fifth Circuit's promotion of the
common definition of "home" as a taxpayer's principal residence.83 Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit in James did not specifically address the issue.84 However, the court
stated that if it had considered the issue, it would have found a common definition
to be appropriate, suggesting a rationale similar to that exhibited by the dissent in
Flowers and the Fifth Circuit. 85 Finally, the First Circuit in Hantzis side-stepped a
definition, but determined the holding of the case by examining the rationale behind
the statute.86 Again, however, in a concurring opinion by Judge Keeton, the common
definition was advocated. 87 As these cases demonstrate, courts seem reluctant to
make a definitive announcement as to the meaning of the term "home."
Generally, a court's refusal to take a position on a specific topic, especially the
United States Supreme Court's refusal, is not construed as indicative of anything in
particular.88 However, by their silence, courts may be indicating that this issue is one
most appropriately decided by the Legislature.89
79. Id. at 256 (Keeton, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 257 (Keeton, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
84. James, 308 F.2d at 208.
85. Id. at 206 n.3.
86. Hantzis, 638 F.2d at 253.
87. Id. at 257 (Keeton, J., concurring).
88. Telephone Interview with Professor Brain Landsberg, McGeorge School of Law (May 4, 2001).
89. Id.
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D. Relevant Case Law not Discussed in Henderson
Further illustrating the confusion in the case law are a series of tax court cases
not cited in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Henderson. Four of these cases suggest
that a taxpayer in Henderson's position should be allowed to deduct meal and
lodging expenses while traveling pursuant to his employment. The last case directly
contradicts these first four by suggesting that a taxpayer in Henderson's position
should not be allowed to deduct such expenses. Even more frustrating about these
cases, however, is their factual similarity making any attempt at distinguishing one
from another difficult.
In Boyer v. Commissioner, the taxpayers were employed by a traveling ice show
that performed about ten months out of the year in various cities. 9° The taxpayers
built a home in Austria and spent approximately four weeks of the year there.
Neither were citizens of that country, nor did they engage in professional activities
there. 9' During Christmas vacations, the taxpayers vacationed at their South Lake
Tahoe condominium. 92
The tax court made a conclusory finding that the taxpayers' home in Austria was
their "home" within the statutory requirement and therefore allowed the taxpayers
to deduct their expenses for meals and lodging while traveling with the ice show.93
The tax court cursorily observed that the house was a substantial investment, that the
taxpayers paid the costs of maintaining it, and that they spent the bulk of their time
there while not with the ice show; however, the court did not clarify that these were
the reasons for concluding that the home in Austria was the taxpayers' "home" for
statutory purposes.94 In fact, the court stated that it would not serve any useful
purpose to review the various factors leading it to the factual conclusion.95
In Sapson v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was employed as a traveling salesman
and spent more than eight months out of the year traveling outside San Antonio, his
claimed home.96 The taxpayer had moved his furniture and personal belongings into
his sister's home where he would stay when he returned to San Antonio from his
business trips. 97 The taxpayer gave his sister money in varying amounts.98 The tax
court allowed the taxpayer to deduct expenses for meals and lodging, explaining that
the amount paid for permanent lodging is not determinative of whether permanent
90. Boyer v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1329 (1977).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Sapson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 636, 636 (1968).
97. Id. at 637.
98. Id.
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lodging is maintained.99 Thus, the tax court suggested that nominal payment would,
in appropriate circumstances, suffice for purposes of the statutory requirement.' °
Likewise in Ralston v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was employed as a groom
for a racing stable which required him to travel around the country and remain in
Louisville, Kentucky, only one month out of the year.'0 1 The taxpayer contributed
only a small amount to his grandmother's household, which he claimed was his
home. 0 2 The tax court allowed the taxpayer deductions for meals while traveling
away from home, holding that the fact that the taxpayer did not have substantial,
continuing, and duplicate expenses was not always determinative.
3
Similarly, in Rambo v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, an accountant and
timekeeper, was sent to work on projects in Florida, Puerto Rico, and Utah, because
there was no work available in his home state of Montana."°4 These projects resulted
in him spending approximately one month per year in a cabin in Montana. 10 5
Nevertheless, the tax court allowed the taxpayer to deduct his meal and lodging
expenses, concluding that the Montana cabin was sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement. The court further concluded that the details of a taxpayer's lifestyle
should not control the deductibility of expenses incurred at his various work
locations.l'6 Similar to the Boyer court, the court stated that a review of the facts that
led to its conclusion would not serve any useful purpose.'0 7
In contrast to the above mentioned tax court cases is Barone v. Commissioner,
in which a long-distance truck driver attempted to establish his parents' home as his
tax home for purposes of section 162.108 The taxpayer stayed at his parents' home
about four and one half months out of the year and paid his mother approximately
five-hundred dollars in rent and his share of the utilities. 1 09 The tax court determined
that the taxpayer's principal place of business was on the road, that the five-hundred
dollars in rent and utilities was nominal, and, consequently, that there was no
duplication of expenses to legitimize the declaration of his parents' home as his tax
home." 0
99. Id. at 644.
100. Id.
101. Ralston v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1312, 1313 (1968).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1314.
104. Rambo v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 920, 924 (1978).
105. Id. at 923.
106. Id. at 925.
107. Id.
108. Barone v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 462, 463 (1985)..
109. Id. at 466.
110. Id.
2001 / Henderson v. Commissioner
III. HENDERSON V. COMMISSIONER
A. The Facts
The taxpayer, James 0. Henderson, graduated from college in 1989 with a
degree in theatrical arts.' During 1990, the taxpayer worked as a lighting
technician for Walt Disney's World on Ice. 112 The show toured, stopping in various
cities for brief periods of time. 1 3 The taxpayer traveled on three tours during
1990.114 The first tour lasted from January I to May 13, 1990, and included stops in
several states. 1 ' The second tour ran from July to November of 1990 and consisted
of shows exclusively in Japan." 6 The third tour lasted from December 5 to
December 31, 1990, and included stops in a few states. ' 7 The taxpayer was
employed on a tour-by-tour basis, signing a new employment contract before each
tour."8 While traveling, the taxpayer received a thirty dollars per day allowance for
expenses and stayed in hotel rooms with other employees. 119
When not on tour, the taxpayer returned to his parents' house in Boise, Idaho,
where he kept his car, dog, and other personal belongings. 20 He was registered to
vote, licensed to drive, and paid state income taxes in Idaho. 12' Although, the
taxpayer had no ownership interest in his parents' house and paid no rent, he did
perform some work around the house when he was not traveling, including painting,
electrical repairs, landscaping, and building a dog house.' 2 The taxpayer's total
financial contribution to the household consisted of five-hundred dollars to purchase
supplies needed to perform these activities. 23 The taxpayer claimed deductions on
his Federal income tax return for expenses incurred while traveling on the tours. 124
The issue presented in Henderson was whether the taxpayer could deduct expenses
for travel "while away from home" pursuant to section 162.125
111. James 0. Henderson v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1407 (1995), aff'd on appeal, 143 F.3d 497
(9th Cir. 1998).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1408.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
430
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B. The Tax Court
The tax court held that the taxpayer could not deduct these expenses because
Boise, Idaho, was not his tax home.1 26 The tax court defined "home" to mean the
vicinity of a taxpayer's principal place of business. 27 Furthermore, a primary
consideration in determining whether a taxpayer has a tax home is whether the
taxpayer incurs substantial, continuous, and duplicative living expenses. 28 Applying
these standards, the court found that while the taxpayer did spend his idle time in
Boise, Idaho, his employment had no. connection there. 129 Additionally, the
taxpayer's minimal financial contribution to his parents' home was not sufficient
evidence of substantial, continuous, and duplicative expenses. 3 0
C. The Ninth Circuit
1. Majority
The Ninth Circuit, while affirming the tax court's decision, applied standards
set forth in the cases and rulings discussed above in Part 11.13' First, the court
employed the three criteria test designed in Flowers, identifying the second
criterion-the expense must be incurred while away from home-as the linchpin
issue in the case. 32 The court, with no independent analysis, stated that the issue was
resolved against the taxpayer by the tax court, which had found that the taxpayer's
choice of residence had nothing to do with any business necessity, and, therefore,
the expenses were not incurred "while away from home."'
133
Next, the court defined "home" as a taxpayer's abode at his principal place of
business, and applied the James standard, noting that, in the case of a continually
traveling taxpayer, it is possible that a tax home may not exist at all if he does not
duplicate substantial, continuous living expenses for a permanent home maintained
for some business reason. 34 Finally, the court recalled that the purpose of the
deduction was to mitigate the burden of travel expenses actually borne by taxpayers.
Without much analysis, the court resolved the issue against the taxpayer.
135
The court then applied the three factor test contained in Revenue Ruling 73-529,
which may be understood as the key test in reaching a conclusion in the case. 136 The
126. Id. at 1407.
127. Id. at 1408.
128. Id. at 1409.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1407.
131. See supra Part II (discussing background authority).
132. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 499.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 500.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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three factors were: (1) whether the taxpayer performs a portion of his business in the
vicinity of this claimed abode and uses such abode while performing such business
there; (2) whether the taxpayer's living expenses incurred at this claimed abode are
duplicated because his business requires him to be away therefrom; and (3) whether
the taxpayer (a) has not abandoned the vicinity in which his historical place of
lodging and his claimed abode are both located, (b) has a member or members of his
family currently residing at the abode, or (c) uses his claimed abode frequently for
purposes of his lodging.' 37
With respect to the first criterion, the court reasoned that the taxpayer had no
business connection to Boise, Idaho, but rather had only returned there for personal
reasons.38 The court then addressed the second criterion, but paraphrased the
language as "the duplicative nature of the taxpayer's living expenses while traveling
and at the claimed home."' 139 The paraphrasing is significant for reasons discussed
below. 40 The court stressed that the evidence demonstrated that the taxpayer lived
with his parents in Boise, Idaho, paid no rent, and had no ownership interest in his
parent's home. 141 Additionally, the court concluded that the taxpayer's financial
contributions in Boise, Idaho, were too limited to be considered substantial,
continuous living expenses. 142 The court ended its analysis of the three factors set
out in Revenue Ruling 73-529 by stating that because the first two factors weighed
against finding that the taxpayer had a tax home in Boise, it was not clear error to
discount evidence on the final factor, personal attachment to Boise. 43 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court's disallowance of the deduction to the
taxpayer. '4
2. Judge Kozinski's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kozinski wrote a strong dissent, calling attention to factual distinctions,
questioning the propriety of applying certain tests, and considering general ideas of
fairness. 145 Judge Kozinski began by stating, in line with Justice Rutledge in Flowers
and Judge Keeton in Hantzis, that "home" was not a term of art, and should be given
a reasonable definition in applying Section 162.146 Judge Kozinski went on to
distinguish Hantzis by stating that the itinerant nature of the taxpayer's work
prevented him from obtaining residence at his principal place of business even if it
137. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37.
138. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 500.
139. Id.
140. See infra Part II.D (exploring the language used to articulate the second criterion).
141. Henderson, 143 3d at 500.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 501.
144. Id.
145. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
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had been his desire to do so, unlike the law student taxpayer in Hantzis who could
have obtained such permanent residence. 147 Additionally, Judge Kozinski noted that
the business reason requirement in Hantzis should not be applicable when the job
itself has no permanent location. 1
48
Judge Kozinski distinguished James on its facts, stating that while the taxpayer
in that case had no permanent home, the taxpayer in this case did have a home
where he returned when he was not working.149 Judge Kozinski further warned that
the emphasis in James on duplication of expenses as a test for distinguishing a tax
home must be kept in perspective. 5 ° That is, duplication of expenses, while a
method for distinguishing business from personal expenses, is only one factor
among many others and may lead, if improperly applied, to an erroneous result.'
15
For example, meals are deductible even though the expense is not duplicated.1
5 2
Finally, Judge Kozinski pointed out that Congress had not made an official
announcement as to the definition of "home" in section 162, and while revenue
rulings on which the case ultimately was decided are entitled to some deference,
they are not controlling. 53 Here, according to Judge Kozinski, Revenue Ruling 73-
529 swept too broadly since the taxpayer would get no deduction even if he spent
ten months a year at home as opposed to ten weeks simply because he paid no
rent. 154
D. Critique of Henderson
It is important at this point to reflect and comment on three of the tests
employed by the Ninth Circuit in its disposition of Henderson.5' In doing so, it is
interesting to note how the facts of Henderson were slightly misapplied, or simply
misplaced. First, consider the application of the second criterion from the Flowers
case-the expense must be incurred "while away from home."'' 56 In Flowers, the
criterion never was applied. 157 In Henderson, however, the court assumed that if the
taxpayer's choice to live in a particular location was not a result of business
necessity, then the expenses were not incurred "while away from home."' 158 It is
unclear how the former exactly satisfies or is even related to the latter. However, the
confusion was primarily a result of the Supreme Court's failure to explain the
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 502 n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 502 n.2 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. See supra Part 11 (discussing each test in the context of their formulation).
156. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 472.
157. Id.
158. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 499.
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criterion and its functions. Therefore, the application of the test was somewhat
questionable in Henderson.
Second, consider the application of the Hantzis business necessity
approach-i.e., Section 162 seeks to relieve the burden on the taxpayer who must
maintain more than one home and consequently incur additional living expenses
because of the necessity of his business. 159 That approach was formulated in a case
involving dual residences. 160 There, the nature of the taxpayer's employment
allowed for such dual residency. 16 1 In contrast, the taxpayer in Henderson had only
one residence, and, more importantly, the nature of his employment prevented him
from establishing a second residence. 162 Therefore, the factual distinctions involved
in the cases prevents the successful application of a test formulated in the prior case
to the fact pattern in Henderson.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit paraphrased the second criterion from Revenue Ruling
73-529 from, "whether the taxpayer's living expenses incurred at his claimed abode
are duplicated because his business requires him to be away therefrom," to "the
duplicative nature of the taxpayer's living expenses while traveling and at the
claimed home."'163 The first version focuses more on the fact that the taxpayer had
no choice but to incur additional expenses by the very nature of his employment,
while the second version focuses on the duplicity of the expenses without regard to
the control of the taxpayer over his situation. Applying this distinction to the facts
in Henderson, it is conceivable that there would be a different result. The taxpayer's
itinerant living situation was necessitated by the nature of the show-a traveling
show. Therefore, if more focus was given to the fact that the taxpayer did not have
a choice in the matter, as the first articulation of the test seemed to suggest, and less
attention was paid to the fact that he personally did not duplicate his living expenses,
then the outcome of the case might have been different. Although this is a very
subtle distinction, it is important, especially when considering the fact that the
deference given to revenue rulings is a point of contention among courts. If the court
is broadening the Revenue Ruling's implication, it may be given even less deference
as a result. Considering the problems with the tests applied in Henderson, its
outcome, irrespective of the inherent unfairness in the result, is even more
questionable.
159. Hantzis, 638 F.2d at 253.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 498.
163. Rev. Rul 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37; Henderson, 143 F.3d at 500.
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IV. LEGAL AND SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF HENDERSON
A. Statutory Interpretation
While there are several methods of statutory interpretation employed by courts
and legal scholars, it is clear that certain methods are more appropriately used with
certain statutes. In light of the extremely technical nature of the Code, a significant
debate has arisen with respect to which method is most appropriate in determining
the correct meaning and application of tax statutes. Below, three methods of
interpretation-purposivism, radical purposivism, and practical reason-will be
discussed and evaluated as tools for interpreting tax statutes. 164 This sub-part
ultimately concludes that the Henderson Court employed a purposive approach,
possibly a radical purposive approach, which yielded flimsy reasoning and a poor
outcome. To reach a more logical result, the court should have applied a practical
reason analysis. 165
1. Purposivism and Radical Purposivism
a. Purposive Analysis
Purposive analysis, as initially articulated by Professors Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks, dictates that a court interpreting a statute should attribute a purpose to the
statute, and then interpret the language to carry out the established purpose. 166 The
limitation on this approach is that the court should take caution that it does not give
the words of the statute "a meaning they will not bear," since "[u]nenacted
intentions or wishes cannot be given effect as law."' 167 Support for the use of
purposivism in tax statute interpretation stems from features peculiar to tax law;
including the high level of technical sophistication, the frequency of tax legislation,
and the existence of broad structural principles that underlie the entire legislative
scheme. 
68
Recently, tax scholars, including Professors Deborah Geier and Lawrence
Zelenak, have articulated more refined statements of the purposive argument.
169
Professor Geier argued that "tax law has a rich history of nonliteral interpretation
164. See infra Parts IV.A.I.a, IV.A.I.b, and IV.A.2.a (evaluating purposivism, radical purposivism, and
practical reason as methods of statutory interpretation).
165. See infra Parts IV.A. I.d and IV.A.2.c (applying and evaluating the application of purposivism, radical
purposivism, and practical reason to the fact pattern presented in Henderson).
166. Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism, "and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAx
L. REV. 677, 680-81 (1996).
167. See id. (citing to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1375 (1958)).
168. Livingston, supra note 166, at 678.
169. Id. at 684-85.
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in order to avoid results that one person or another has considered to be inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute as a whole." 70 The qualification to this argument, as
offered by Professor Geier, is that only an "immediate purpose"-i.e., one that can
be clearly gleaned from the statutory language, legislative history, and broader
structure and policy of the Code-should be relied on to interpret a statute.'
71
Professor Zelenak has offered a similar argument, contending that the complexity
of tax law may require nonliteral interpretation since the statutory pattern in which
the language appears may not reconcile with a literal interpretation.' 72 However,
Professor Zelenak concedes that where statutory language is designed to address a
particular fact pattern, that language should be applied literally regardless of the
statutory pattern in which it appears.
173
b. Radical Purposive Analysis
Some legal scholars, including Professor Bruce Frier, advocate a more radical
purposivism. 74 Professor Frier asserts that systematic legal codes, such as the
Internal Revenue Code, require scholarly interpretation to assist in the derivation of
general principles and policies that judges may use to decide cases consistently.'75
Unlike a purposive approach, radical purposivism does not require that any
purpose be initially attributed to the enacting legislature, but only derived from the
legislation's application by judges and practitioners. 76 This suggests that the
legislature would make only an initial decision to adopt income tax provisions and
that later generations of "experts," most likely tax professors, would interpret such
provisions. 77 The legislature could overrule these experts, but only if it did so in a
clear and convincing fashion.
78
c. Limitations on Purposivism and Radical Purposive Analysis
Purposive and radical purposive analyses in tax cases share three drawbacks,
and there is an additional drawback to radical purposivism. First, purposive and
radical purposive analyses provide a "poor explanation for the holdings in major tax
cases."'179 Second, when courts attempt an application of a purposive or radical
purposive analysis, the results are varied, often "requiring further litigation to
170. Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492,493 (1995).
171. See id. at 514-15 (citing to Robert S. Summers & Geoffrey Marshall, The Argument from Ordinary
Meaning in Statutory Interpretation, 43 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 213 (1992)).
172. Livingston, supra note 166, at 685.
173. Id. at 686.
174. Id. at 688.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 689.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 701.
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determine the scope of the original rule."' 80 Third, purposivism and radical
purposivism are subject to the problem of questionable political assumptions "and
potential conflicts with other values and methods."18 l Finally, and with respect only
to radical purposivism, there is the controversial issue of transferring legislative
authority to the whims and variety of tax legal scholarship.1
82
The most serious critique of purposivism and radical purposivism is the fact
that, since a statute often has multiple purposes, purposive analysis is unlikely.to
provide a definitive resolution to a case. 183 As a result, courts often use other
methods of interpretation; such as text, legislative history, or judicial and
administrative precedent, under the guise of purposive analysis and do not
communicate the details of their methodology.
8 4
A second critique common to purposive and radical purposive analysis is that
once statutory language has been disregarded as an interpretation tool and is
replaced by some underlying policy, parties will present a multitude of arguments,
and courts will be burdened with extensive additional litigation. 85 Two specific
dangers are presented with this particular problem. First, a purposive interpretation
advanced by a party under one set of circumstances may apply to that party's
detriment under a different set of circumstances. 186 As a result, courts may find
themselves drawn into an endless process of judicial legislation, creating extensions
to and exceptions from new formulas in a manner best left to legislative bodies.
87
Second, a purposive interpretation may also lead to dubious substantive results.
88
Often times, courts would be better off simply limiting their analyses of cases to
their specific facts. 189 Statutes have multiple purposes, and attempts to identify
simple interpretive principles lead to bad law.' 90
A third criticism to which both purposivism and radical purposivism are
susceptible is the unrealistic underlying assumption that a reasonable legislature is
pursuing clear, well-established, public goals.' 9' According toProfessors Hart and
Sacks, courts should assume that the legislature was comprised of reasonable
180. Id. at 702.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 709-10.
183. Id. at 702.
184. See Boyer, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1329 (illustrating a statement by a court that it would not serve any
useful purpose to review the various factors leading to its factual conclusion); Rambo, 69 T.C. at 925 (demonstrating
a statement by a court that a review of the facts that led to its decision would not be of any use).
185. See supra Parts II.C and II.D (discussing the long history of contradictory case law examined by the
Henderson Court and other applicable cases not directly discussed).
186. Livingston, supra note 166, at 707.
187. See supra Parts II.C and II.D (exemplifying the seemingly endless body of contradictory holdings).
188. See Henderson, 143 F.3d at 497 (illustrating how purposive interpretation can lead to poor substantive
outcomes).
189. Livingston, supra note 166, at 707.
190. Id. at 707-08.
191. Id. at 708.
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persons in pursuit of reasonable goals.' 92 However, recent political critique questions
the model of a reasonable legislature pursuing reasonable goals. 93 In fact, political
criticism suggests that legislation is nothing more than the result of backroom
bargaining between legislators and special interest groups with no underlying public
purpose. 1
94
A final critique that applies specifically to radical purposivism is that too much
legislative power would be conferred on legal scholars in non-legislative
positions.195 Radical purposivism allows underlying tax principles to undercut the
plain meaning of statutory language. 96 At the very least, radical purposivism
suggests that underlying tax principles can only be modified by a clear
congressional effort-a tremendous task for non-tax experts. 197 This approach
demonstrates an over-stated sense of the importance of interpreting tax scholars.98
The main criticism is that radical purposivism suggests stagnant rather than
progressive doctrines and emphasizes structural principles over all other interpretive
devices.' 99
d. Application to Henderson
In examining the court's reasoning in Henderson, the court used a purposive
analysis. The court first attributed a purpose to the statute and then interpreted the
statute's language to carry out the attributed purpose. 200 The court, in James,
examined the statutory predecessor to Section 162 and explained that the deduction
was "designed to mitigate the burden on taxpayers who travel on business. 22 ' After
determining the statute's purpose, the court interpreted the term "home" to mean
"principal place of business. 2 °2 Arguably, the court employed a radical purposive
approach because it did not adhere to the usual judicial limitation that cautions
courts not to give the words of a statute "a meaning they will not bear., 203 The court
gave the word "home," commonly understood as a person's principal residence, the
artificial meaning of "principal place of business. 2 °4 Moreover, this meaning,
192. Id. at 681.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 708.
196. Id. at 709.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 710.
200. See Livingston, supra note 166 and accompanying text (describing the purposive approach ofProfessors
Hart and Sacks).
201. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 499.
202. Id. at 499-500.
203. See Flowers, 326 U.S. at 471-73 (giving the word "home" a meaning of "principal place of business"
rather than "principal residence").
204. Henderson, 143 F.3d at 499.
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consistent with radical purposivism, was derived from analysis of prior case law. 20 5
The court stated, "we have held [in a number of prior cases] that the term 'home'
means 'the taxpayer's abode at his or her principal place of employment."
' 206
The criticisms of purposive analysis can be readily identified in the results of
Henderson. For instance, the purposive analysis employed by the court does not
yield a very satisfactory explanation for the outcome in the case. Simply because
that is the way we have always done it does not demonstrate any meaningful
examination into the dilemma presented by the fact pattern.27 The court fails to
explain why a taxpayer with a non-traditional work arrangement, necessitated by the
nature of his employment, should not be allowed to take the tax deduction.20 8 That
is, the court did not reveal what theoretical assumptions lie behind the given
definition of "home" such that redefinition of the term to allow the taxpayer to take
the deduction would be precluded.
In addition, courts will be confronted with this issue more frequently in the
future since there will be a rise in alternative work arrangements that result in a more
itinerant work force, making the validity of the holding dubious, and future
applications confusing.2°
Furthermore, the court seemed to infer that the legislature, in promulgating this
statute, was pursuing a specific purpose. 210 However, when the statutory language
was examined, it was found to be deceptively simple.2 Moreover, the revenue
rulings promulgated by the IRS, having only the deference that individual courts
choose to give it, are likewise rather unhelpful in that they do not specifically
address the situation presented in Henderson.1 2 The simplicity of the statute as well
as the lack of assistance offered by the revenue rulings suggest that neither the
legislature, nor the IRS, had a very clear understanding of the potential reach of the
statute and the issues that would eventually stem from its application.
Finally, with respect to the argument that the Henderson court employed radical
purposivism, the court was given too much interpretive power. The court did not
have to, nor did it, adhere to any legislative interpretation, even though a literal
205. See id. (discussing prior case law as a basis for the Henderson decision).
206. Id. at 499.
207. See id. (relying solely on supporting case law and giving no deference to any other considerations in
coming to a conclusion in Henderson).
208. See id. (demonstrating a lack of explanation of this holding in light of the special circumstances
presented in Henderson).
209. See infra Part IV.B (providing a study of the increasing popularity of modem work arrangements in the
United States).
210. While the Henderson court did not specifically state that it was using purposive analysis, examination
of its analysis leads me to the conclusion that it did indeed employ this method. If the court is employing purposive
analysis, then it is rational to assume that the court determined that the legislature was pursuing a specific purpose
with its tax legislation; see supra Part IV.A.I.c (discussing the third criticism of purposive and radical purposive
analysis as well as Professors' Hart and Sacks purposive method).
211. See supra Part II.A (examining the language of § 162).
212. See supra Part 11.B (analyzing the revenue rulings pertinent to §162).
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meaning could have been applied easily.213 Furthermore, the court would not have
to change its interpretation, of ,home" unless the legislature enacted, in clear
language, a different meaning of the term.214 The likelihood that the legislature
would undertake such a modification is minimal considering the difficulty that such
action would entail.
Thus, the Henderson Court employed a flawed analysis which resulted, not
.surprisingly, in bad law. However, despite such clear proof of the shortcomings of
purposive analysis, modern courts continue to employ the rhetoric of legislative
purpose in the context of tax litigation.21 5 Taxpayers can only hope that the courts'
continued use of purposivism stems from their failure to find another workable
approach. If this is the case, then the following introduction of the practical reason
method might alleviate the confusion and unfairness that otherwise will be borne by
future taxpayers facing the denial of the section 162 deduction.
2. Practical Reason
a. Practical Reason
The practical reason approach, as articulated by Professors William Eskridge
and Philip Frickey, is a better analytical approach to tax cases. This approach calls
for the consideration of many factors including statutory language, legislative
history, judicial and administrative precedents, public policy, as well as the
consequences of alternative interpretations. 16 While not all of these factors share the
same degree of importance, the particular combination of factors weighed will
217Adiinlythdepend on the applicable provision and the facts at issue. Additionally, the
practical reason approach allows courts to consider general tax law characteristics,
including, the age of the Code, the existence of a unified Code, and practical
considerations associated with tax decisions. 18
The age of the Code as well as the sheer number of tax decisions indicate that
an evolving interpretation, referred to as evolutive perspective, will be very
important in tax cases.21 9 Evolutive perspective will be particularly important with
older provisions, especially when those provisions do not specifically address the
issue presented.22°
213. See Henderson, 143 F.3d at 497 (exemplifying the Henderson court's lack of reliance on any particular
legislative intent); supra Part IV.A. 1.b (discussing the deference, or lack thereof, that courts are required to give
to legislative intent under radical purposivism).
214. See supra Part IV.A.I.b (examining the attributes of radical purposivism, particularly the legislature's
limited role in statutory interpretation).
215. Livingston, supra note 166, at 689-90.
216. Id. at 720.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 720-21.
219. Id. at 720.
220. Id. at 721.
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The existence of a unified Code requires careful interpretation of individual
provisions. 22' The meaning of any statutory provision is a combination of its
independent meaning and its meaning in the context of the Code.222 In order to
maintain consistency throughout the Code and avoid disjointedness, courts must pay
particular attention to the textual perspective.223
Finally, there are important practical consequences associated with tax
decisions, particularly the revenue effects.224 The large sums of money at stake in
tax litigation, in combination with the shrewd taxpayer's ability to move money
quickly in order to take advantage of any loopholes, presents the potential for
substantial revenue loss to the government.22' Equally problematic, however, is the
fact that many interpretations yield unfair results to lay taxpayers creating the
potential for unfair revenue gain to the government.226 Thus, these considerations
become significant when interpreting tax statutes.
b. Advantages
The advantages of practical reason analysis over purposivism are substantial.
Practical reason analysis is a more rigorous method of analysis because it permits
courts to consider a variety of interpretive factors rather than emphasize one
perspective consistently over the others.227 A court using practical reason analysis
is forced to engage in an application of textual, historical, and evolutive perspectives
rather than just relying on a purposive argument.228 In addition, practical reason
stresses the importance of maintaining consistency in the Code.229 This priority
dovetails with the movement toward simplification and clarification of the Code.
Consistency in the Code would contribute greatly to lay comprehension, a distinct
advantage for lay taxpayers.230 Finally, practical reason analysis will result in a more
realistic development of tax law. 231 Tax law would be the result of a compromise
between statutory purposes and real-world demands.232
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 720.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 721.
230. See Henderson, 143 F.3d at 501 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
231. Livingston, supra note 166, at 723.
232. Id.
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c. Application to Henderson
Employing practical method analysis in Henderson would have yielded a much
more reasonable result that would be easier to apply to future cases should they
arise. The court would have been forced to apply textual, historical, and evolutive
analyses and to weigh their outcomes in light of the age of section 162. The court
would also have considered the fact that the Code uses "home" in other contexts to
refer to principal place of residence, and the practical consideration that modem
work arrangements are making American workers increasingly itinerant.233
A textual analysis would seem to yield a meaning of the word "home" as
principal residence for two reasons. First, the context of the statute does not suggest
any meaning of "home" other than the commonly understood meaning.3 Second,
application of the plain meaning rule, an interpretive tool in statutory analysis,
dictates that when the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, an
interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words and terms
should be adopted. 5
A historical analysis of case law would yield a mess of contradictory holdings
likely to be of little help to a court attempting to find some common thread of
ideology. 23
6
Finally, evolutive considerations would include the increasingly itinerant
American workforce. 237 Application of the section 162 deduction, as it. currently
stands, would be totally inconsistent with this modem movement toward worker
mobility, thereby prompting a change in the way the deduction is applied. Such an
analysis would yield a favorable result to the taxpayer in Henderson.
B. Modem Work Arrangements
1. Advancements in Commuting Technology
In today's working world, employees demand a more balanced lifestyle.238
Included in this demand is a desire for more efficient methods of commuting so as
not to waste valuable time. Urban Planning and Department of Transportation
officials have taken advantage of recent technological advancements and have
233. See supra Part IV.A.2.a (discussing the attributes of the practical reason method).
234. See supra Part II.A (examining the language of section 162).
235. See generally Jefferson County v. Clark Refining & Marketing Inc., 2000 WL 1593 (1999)
(demonstrating the use of the plain meaning rule as a device for statutory interpretation in the context of tax
statutes).
236. See supra Part II.C and II.D (discussing the history of contradictory holdings preceding Henderson).
237. See infra Part IV.B (examining the changes in traditional work arrangements that are resulting in a more
itinerant work force).
238. See Ellen E. O'Daniell, Energizing Corporate Culture and Creating Competitive Advantage: A New
Look at Workforce Programs, BENEFITS QUARTERLY, 18, Apr. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 18545852 (describing
employers' attempt to accommodate their employees' desire to have a balanced lifestyle).
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created more commuting alternatives resulting in more efficient transportation. The
effect of more efficient transportation has been a more itinerant workforce able to
travel longer distances. Examples of the currently available alternatives include
airplanes, helicopters, and sophisticated trains.239 Future alternatives could include
completely personal airplanes, levitation trains, and smart-cars.
240
Many modern commuters accomplish what was unthinkable only 20 years ago;
they live in Los Angeles and work in San Francisco. Commuter airplane travel
programs are affordable, convenient, and enable the working professional to be in
one state from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and in another from 6 p.m. to 7 a.m. 241 Several
regional airlines such as United Airlines and Southwest Airlines already offer daily
round trips on express non-stop flights and are continuing to expand commuter
travel programs.242 This past year, United Airlines leased ten more gates at Denver
Airport so as to augment its 31 shuttle departures every day to Phoenix, Las Vegas,
and Salt Lake city using Boeing 737 jets.243 United Airlines Shuttle by United
program is its high-frequency, lower-cost service. 2" Southwest Airlines has a similar
program with daily direct flights out of Southern California's Inland Empire to such
cities as San Francisco, Phoenix, and Las Vegas.245 The combination of ticketless
travel, laptop computers, cell phones, and daily flights has made commercial
airplane travel convenient, simple, and increasingly popular with the American
workforce.
In addition to commercial airplane travel, commuters who travel to remote
locations or at odd times; and are unable to take advantage of commercial flight
options, can now charter private airplanes and even helicopters due to increasing
availability and affordable rates.246 A good example of this option is in the Toronto
area.247 A local flying school will transport "commuters in a one-passenger Cessna
150 at any airport or airstrip in the Toronto area" and fly them to the Toronto City
Centre Airport for routes as inexpensive as $118 an hour.248 Commuters also can
defer costs by traveling in groups of three and chartering a Cessna 172 for
239. See infra Part IV.B.1 (describing currently available commuting alternatives).
240. See infra Part IV.B (anticipating commuting alternatives possible in the future).
241. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (exploring commercial air travel options for daily commuters).
242. UNrrED AIRLINES, INC., 2001 CUSTOMER PAMPHLET (2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., 2001 CUSTOMER PAMPHLET (2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
243. Jeffrey Leib, UnitedAirlines To Lease Remaining Gates at DenverAirport, DENVER POST, Apr. 19,1999,
available in 1999 WL 22019683.
244. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 2001 CUSTOMER PAMPHLET (2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
245. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., 2001 CUSTOMER PAMPHLET (2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
246. Laura Boback, Winging It! A Chopper Can Bring You From Bolton In 10 Minutes, TORONTO SUN,
Apr. 19,1999, at 28, available in 1999 WL 15892955.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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approximately $45 an hour per traveler.249 Finally, for, commuters who have more
money to spend on transportation costs, time can be further saved by chartering a
one-passenger Robinson R-22 training helicopter for $310 an hour.250
A final modem commuting alternative is travel by train.25' The three most
common types in use in many major cities are rapid rail, commuter trains, and
intercity rail.252 Rapid rail is best suited for dense cities.253 Rapid rail trains run on
special electrified tracks at intervals throughout the day and do not intersect streets
at ground level.254 Stops on rapid rail trains "are frequent and passenger trips are
short. 255 In contrast, commuter trains "operate on existing freight rail lines and run
primarily at rush hour to take riders to and from work between city and suburb. 256
These trains usually radiate 50 miles from the central city, with a few broadly
spaced stops, and may have several crossings at street level.257 Finally, "intercity rail
moves . . . passengers between population centers over long distances and can
compete with airplane flights of 100 to 500 miles. 258
A good example of these options used contemporaneously is in Southern
California. For instance, commuters residing in San Diego county can travel by
Amtrak, an intercity train, to Union Station in downtown Los Angeles.259 At Union
Station commuters transfer to either the Red or Blue Line-rapid rail
trains--depending on the direction of their ultimate destination. Likewise,
commuters residing in outlying suburbs of the Los Angeles, such as West Covina,
can travel by Metrolink, a commuter train, to Union Station in downtown Los
Angeles where they then transfer to the rapid rail trains.260 This sophisticated
transportation system was implemented in the Los Angeles area over thepast 15
years as an attempt by transportation officials to facilitate the flow of commuter
traffic. The system has become very popular among Southern California commuters.
While these modern alternatives seem to be the wave of the future, many people,
including, perhaps, the members of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, are still
dubious as to the percentage of American workers who actually will take advantage
of these options for daily long distance travel. To these skeptics' great disbelief,
however, long distance travel is becoming increasingly more common. A recent
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article published in the Chicago Tribune detailing commuter travel at Midway
Airport is evidence of the large percentage of American workers who make a daily
long distance commute.261 Regular business travelers fly anywhere from one to five
times a week.262 According to a spokeswoman for Chicago's Department of
Aviation, Midway runs 10,000 to 15,000 regular business travelers through its
terminals daily.263 For these "airborne commuters," constant flight is simply a part
of the job.264 They have adapted to air travel, which has become easier with the2651 omue
advent of cell phones, laptop computers, and electronic organizers. Onecommuter
commented that he had traveled daily for the past eight years and had racked up
353,000 miles on one airline in the past year alone.266
The availability of these modern alternatives, combined with other feats in
communication technology, facilitate long distance commuter travel. The result of
all of this is an increasingly itinerant American workforce-i.e., a workforce whose
principal residence does not equate with principal place of business. Applying the
Henderson holding, none of these transportation costs would be deductible as
section 162 travel expenses, an extremely unfair outcome considering it is often not
the choice of the employee to travel long distances. Rather, it is the nature of her
occupation that requires such travel.
Even if the Ninth Circuit were to claim, in defense of Henderson, that only a
small percentage of the American workforce currently commutes long distances on
a daily basis and therefore would be denied the deduction, plans for future
alternatives that would enable even more workers to commute long distances daily
are already being discussed by transportation officials. Some of these alternatives
include personal aircrafts, levitation trains, and smart-cars.267
A spokesman for Cirrus Design, an airplane manufacturing company, predicts
that in the near future, a growing number of affluent people will use personal aircraft
to travel to and from the office each day.2 68 A spokesman for NASA commented
that, "[t]wenty-five years from now, depending on how some things work out, you
might be able to put.someone in a small airplane, just push a button, and they'll
arrive at the other end safely.' ' 269 Looking even further ahead, a professor of
theoretical physics at the City University of New York said that, "aeronautic
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research is already underway that might one day allow commuters to fly from New
York to Tokyo in an hour or less, making overseas meetings and even overseas
offices more practical. 27°
Levitating trains and smart-cars are also in the development process as options
for the future. 271 High-speed and magnetic levitation trains would best suit travel
between distant destinations with few stops.2 72 In contrast, smart-cars would suit
almost any distance of travel because the passenger would be free to do a multitude
of other tasks.273 The United States Transportation Secretary in George Bush's
administration commented that, "[t]he time will probably come, in 30 or 40 years,
when we will be able to get into an automobile and it will drive itself to wherever
you want to go. ' 274 The founder of BrainReserve, a company that tracks consumer
and cultural trends, predicts that consumers will soon use their cars for multiple
tasks, including "eating, cooking (microwaves in the glove compartment) and
storing food (fridge under the seat) in them. When we need to work rather than eat,
the microwave will pop out to be replaced by a fax." 275
While some of these newer proposals may not come to fruition for another 10
to 50 years, they are evidence of the trend toward increasing mobility in the
American workforce, a trend already in full swing in modem society. The Ninth
Circuit cannot question the reality of this movement and, as a matter of practicality,
should render decisions that make sense in light of this movement.
2. Alternative Work Arrangements
In addition to the advancements in commuting technology, many employers are
establishing alternative work arrangements that contribute to the increasing mobility
of the American workforce. A common example of such an arrangement is hoteling.
Other arrangements go further in confusing the application of the deduction by
calling into question its very purpose. The main example of such an arrangement is
telecommuting. These modem alternatives are additional evidence of the
incompatibility of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 162 with modern
employment schemes, and suggest that a new reading of the statute is necessary to
ensure fairness to and understanding by modem taxpayers and courts.
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a. Hoteling Arrangements
Hoteling arrangements are an increasingly popular response to employees'
demand for a better balance between office and home life and also to employers'
need to have mobile workers. As business becomes increasingly spread out,
employers are having to make a choice between hiring more employees to meet a
national versus local demand or utilizing their current employees by making them
more mobile. With the recent advances in communication technology, the latter
choice has become the standard.
A hoteling arrangement is an office situation designed to be used on a shared-as-
needed-basis. 276 The worker checks in and out of this space, using, then leaving, the
standard business tools and technologies, including laptop computers, fax machines,
modems, and high speed data lines. 277 This type of arrangement is very common in
the expanding consultation industry.
A good illustration of hoteling is offered by PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP.
PricewaterhouseCoopers solicits business in the field of technological consulting
nationwide. While the consulting business is currently booming, each customer is,
by the nature of the business, temporary. The dilemma then presented for businesses
like PricewaterhouseCoopers is whether to fill consulting positions strictly with
temporary employees or somehow to maintain these employees once their respective
consulting task is completed. The problem with the first alternative is mainly the
dissatisfaction of the employee with a temporary status and thus the constant threat
of seeking out and finding a more permanent position. PricewaterhouseCoopers has
managed to avoid this problem by opting for the latter alternative-retaining
employees despite temporary customer relationships-in conjunction with hoteling.
Technology consultants are initially based out of whichever city they choose,
and then are assigned to a region of the United States, to any particular city of which
they can be sent, as needed, based on an assessment of the consultant's skills and
those necessary for the completion of the task.278 A former PricewaterhouseCoopers
employee, living with her parents in San Francisco, was sent to Vancouver, Canada,
for three months and then, upon completion of the project, to Los Angeles
indefinitely.27 9 Although PricewaterhouseCoopers paid for the majority of lodging
and transportation expenses, it did not pay for meals or for all transportation
expenses incurred in returning to San Francisco, which the employee considered her
home.280
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If the Henderson holding were applied to the situation described above, none
of the expenses would be deductible to the employee taxpayer because she likely
would be deemed an itinerant worker. This result would be inherently unfair in that
the employee taxpayer did not choose hoteling as her work arrangement; rather, it
was chosen by PricewaterhouseCoopers. It seems, then, that Henderson would make
this a choice between the lesser of two evils: (1) a temporary position likely lacking
benefits and certainly lacking stability, or (2) a permanent position entailing non-
deductible additional expenses. The Henderson holding is even more egregious
considering that these types of arrangements are becoming increasingly popular and,
in essence, are mandated by the changes in the way modem business is conducted.
b. Telecommuting
Telecommuting can be broadly defined as using information and
communications technologies to perform work away from the traditional worksite,
most commonly from home.28" ' The same advances in communication technology
that enable workers to perform tasks in hoteling arrangements also enable workers
to perform tasks from their personal residences. Such work arrangements call into
question the proper application of the section 162 deduction and even its very
purpose. In order to analyze the section 162 deduction in the telecommunication
setting, it is first necessary to gain a more complete understanding of the origins and
current trends of telecommunication.
The main drivers behind the advent of telecommuting were an increased demand
by employees for a more balanced lifestyle, increased traffic congestion, and
conservation of natural resources.282 When employers instituted telecommuting as
an option for employees, they noticed that their employees were more productive
when they telecommuted.283 As a result, the main selling point of a telecommuting
program is increased productivity. 284
Telecommuters are less likely to restrict their workday to between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m. 285 While a telecommuter may interrupt her workday with errands, she often
will continue working into the night and likely put in more hours than employees
at the office.286 As a result, telecommuters have proven to be highly productive.287
Several examples demonstrate the truth of increased productivity. According to
an AT&T company spokesman, at AT&T, where 29 percent of managers
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telecommute at least once a week, telecommuters put in, on average, five more
hours of work at home than at the office each week;288 Likewise, J.D. Edwards, a
Colorado computer software firm, found that productivity rates for telecommuters
were 20 to 25 percent higher than exclusively in-office employees.289 The common
results experienced by companies such as these have led to a substantial growth in
the number of companies offering telecommuting as an option for employees,
including Dun &Bradstreet, Bell South, U.S. West, Merrill Lynch, Lexis-Nexis, Ely
Lilly, and Cisco.290
The modem telecommuting workforce encompasses all classes of workers.29'
According to the International Telework Association & Council (ITAC), the United
States is currently the leading telework nation as measured by the number of
employees participating in telework arrangements.292 According to new research
based on IDC's 1999 U.S. Residential Telecommunication Survey, 27.4 percent of
all U.S. households reported conducting work from home in some capacity, either
as telecommuters, corporate after-hours workers, or home-based business
operators.293 According to a survey conducted by Cyber Dialogue/Findsvp in 1998,
there were 15.7 million teleworkers in the United States.294 The number of
teleworkers in the U.S. rose to 19.6 million as of mid-1999, according to new
research conducted for ITAC.
295
Telework is a trend closely related to the growing impact of computers and the
Internet.296 The Internet is helping to fundamentally change how employees connect
to employers, giving rise to new working relationships.297 Widespread awareness
and use of the Internet has created a focus on the role of technologies in "the death
of distance. 298
With the increasing availability of new technologies, with whom one works, and
not where one works, is becoming more important in determining modes of
working. 299 It is people, not places, that define an organization as an increasing
proportion of work activity becomes "location-independent. ''300 The concept of
"transportation" now is being transformed from the movement of people to work to
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the movement of work to people.3°' In light of these changes, it is difficult to apply
the section 162 deduction to telecommuting arrangements or even to reconcile the
purpose of the deduction with telecommuting arrangements. Defining a
telecommuter's principal place of business would be extremely difficult since it
would be completely conceivable for a telecommuter to live in Los Angeles and
perform tasks for a New York company. The question would be whether, for
purposes of section 162, the taxpayer's principal place of business was Los Angles
or New York. If the answer were New York, then it would appear that the deduction
would be extremely over-inclusive. Any business related travel would be deductible
as the travel would necessarily be "away from home." An equally troublesome
situation would result if the answer were Los Angeles, in which case the deduction
would be extremely under-inclusive. In that case, no travel expense would be
deductible because the business travel would never be "away from home" in which
event there would be no reason to have the section 162 deduction.
It is again evident that the application of the section 162 deduction, as
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Henderson, must be reconciled with modem
employment schemes to prevent the potentially ridiculous outcomes that may result.
V. CONCLUSION
The failure of courts to create a definitive standard with respect to the section
162 deduction has led to confusion in the case law, as exemplified by the survey of
case law contained in Part II. The Henderson Court, having the opportunity to
clarify the law, only further muddled the issue of the meaning of "home" for section
162 purposes. The court's failure was especially disappointing in that its conclusion
left much to be desired. Instead of employing a practical reason method, the court
employed a purposive method, which, as demonstrated in Part IV, has resulted in
poor substantive results. Moreover, the court failed to recognize the increasing
variety of methods of commuting and alternative work arrangements that are making
American workers, the object of the deduction, more itinerant. In sum, the
Henderson Court failed to capitalize on the opportunity it had to lessen the
confusion that has been plaguing courts and taxpayers alike leaving both hoping for
another day in court.
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